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In the presence of consumers’ incomplete information of firms’ 
ability to produce quality components, we analyze firms’ incentive 
to commit to a long-term relationship as a way to convince con- 
sumers about forming a high-type pair. In contrast to the result 
of no brand leverage obtained by Choi and Jeon (2007), our anal- 
ysis demonstrates that a “brand-named” firm can restore its leverage 
by committing to a long-term relationship. To overcome the time 
inconsistency problem in a long-term contract, firms may utilize 
vertical integration with relation-specific investment. This signaling 
motivation for vertical integration is different from the explanations 
that currently exist.
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incompleteness of contracts, and imperfect competition as possible causes 
for vertical integration.1 These studies, however, disregard the incom- 
plete information that consumers have about firms’ productivities. In this 
context, our paper demonstrates that firms in a vertical relationship may 
have a reason for using a long-term contract or vertical integration with 
relation-specific investment to signal their capabilities to produce qual- 
ity components. 
We analyze vertical relationships in which production of a useful final 
good requires two complementary components of good quality. Each com- 
ponent is produced by one of the partner firms that belong to two dif- 
ferent sectors. In each sector, two types of firms exist, namely the high- 
and the low-type firm: The former has a higher probability of producing 
a good-quality component than the latter. Consumers may infer which 
firm is accountable for a failed final product; they, however, have in- 
complete information about firm types. There are two periods, with each 
period being composed of a complete production and consumption cycle. 
Partner firms in period 1 may either continue or not their production 
partnership in period 2 depending on whether they sign a long-term or 
a short-term contract, respectively. Based on our analysis, the necessary 
and sufficient condition for a separating equilibrium, in which only 
pairs of high-type firms are productive, is weaker under a long-term 
contract than under a short-term one. This is so, if firms’ probability of 
producing quality components is high enough. Therefore, firms in a ver- 
tical relationship may have an incentive to use a long-term contract as 
the leverage to convince consumers that they are forming a pair of high- 
type firms.
Our analysis also shows the ex post gain from voiding a long-term 
contract and engaging in re-matching with other firms in period 2. This, 
however, may threaten the credibility of a long-term contract as a com- 
mitment device for a long-term production relationship. As an alterna- 
tive, we consider vertical integration with relation-specific investment 
that would eliminate the cause of engaging in re-matching with other 
1 Williamson (1971) advanced his seminal proposition that vertical integration 
is more likely when firms make relationship-specific investments, and Grossman 
and Hart (1986) developed a property-rights theory of integration in the context 
of an incomplete contract. From then on, a large volume of theoretical and em- 
pirical studies has explored the issue of vertical integration and long-term con- 
tracts. For a survey of such studies, see Gibbons (2005). With regard to liter- 
ature on the strategic aspects of vertical integration under imperfect competi- 
tion, see Rey and Tirole (2007), and Avenel (2008).
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firms in period 2. Because the relation-specific investment is mainly 
used to convince consumers of a long-term production relationship, this 
signaling motivation for vertical integration that we suggest is different 
from the existing explanations for vertical integration.
Although this paper largely focuses on the case in which consumers 
have no problem in inferring the cause(s) of failure of their products, 
we show that the main result of the paper, the existence of an incen- 
tive for vertical integration for quality signaling, continues to hold even 
when consumers cannot infer the cause(s) of failure of their products. 
We discuss several cases of vertical integration as examples of vertical 
integration for quality signaling. Two of which are, the cases of Harim 
corporation, a major supplier of chicken meat products in Korea, and 
that of Swatch Group Korea, a Korean subsidiary of a multinational 
watch company, Swatch Group. The case of Korean whole life insurance 
market is also discussed to demonstrate the crucial role of foreign di- 
rection investment in creating a market for a certain product by ena- 
bling a separating equilibrium. The importance of a long-term contract 
or vertical integration for quality signaling may also be relevant in glob- 
alization; that is, firms have started to rely more on input supplies of 
foreign firms, of which consumers often have very limited information. 
Our analysis is based on a simple production relationship model de- 
veloped by Choi and Jeon (2007). They focused on the issue of “co- 
branding” that temporarily links firms in a new sector (i.e., a sector of 
which consumers have incomplete information about firms’ types) to the 
established firms with brand names in a mature sector. In particular, 
they analyzed whether such short-term co-branding may facilitate high- 
type firms in the new sector to signal their types so they can establish 
their own reputation (i.e,. whether an established firm can utilize its 
brand name as its leverage to convince consumers about its pairing 
with a high-type firm in a new sector under a short-term contract).2 In 
2 Compared with the case of no mature sector (i.e., no established firm to 
co-brand with), “co-branding” can relax the necessary and sufficient condition 
for a separating equilibrium only when “complementary between components 
(i.e., a successful final product requiring good components from both sectors)” 
and “cross-sector inference problem (i.e., consumers not being able to infer which 
firm is responsible for a failed final products)” exist. Tadelis (1999) developed a 
name trade model in an adverse selection framework with overlapping genera- 
tions of firms. Choi and Jeon (2007) extended this name trade analysis of 
Tadelis (1999) into the analysis of a brand extension in multiple sectors with 
only one sector having brand names. Their analysis also differed from those of 
Tadelis (1999) and Cabral (2000) by relaxing the assumption of prices being 
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contrast to the result of no brand leverage obtained by Choi and Jeon 
(2007) in the absence of any cross-sector inference problem, our anal- 
ysis demonstrates that a firm with a brand name can restore its brand 
leverage by committing to a long-term production relationship. 
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the setup of 
our model. Section 3 analyzes the case of a short-term contract, which 
essentially replicates the results of Choi and Jeon (2007). In Section 4, 
we first assume that firms can sign a long-term contract that forces 
partner firms in period 1 to continue their pairing in period 2, compar- 
ing the outcomes under such a longer-term contract with those under 
a short-term contract in Section 3. In a subsection of Section 4, we 
analyze the enforceability of a long-term contract and suggest vertical 
integration with relation-specific investment as an alternative way to 
commit a long-term production relationship. Section 5 shows that an 
incentive for signing a long-term contract or engaging in vertical in- 
tegration exists even in the presence of cross-sector inference problem. 
It also discusses other robustness-related issues and provides examples 
of vertical integration for quality signaling. Section 6 presents the con- 
clusion and discusses the possible extensions of our analysis. 
II. Model 
The basic setup of our model follows that of Choi and Jeon (2007). 
We consider a market for a final product that requires two complemen- 
tary components, x and y. A continuum of firms producing component 
x has a mass normalized to 1. Another mass 1 of firms produces com- 
ponent y. We consider a two-period model in which each firm can pro- 
duce at most one unit in each period. Consumers are homogeneous in 
their willingness to pay for the final product, and their mass is as- 
sumed as more than 1 in each period, implying that the sellers are on 
the short side of the market.3
equal to the consumers’ willingness to pay, which in turn enables them to 
compare price signaling with brand signaling.
3 Both assumptions, namely, consumers’ being homogeneous and sellers being 
on the short side of the market are strong, as pointed out by a referee. These 
simplifying assumptions, which enable the second-period pricing to take a simple 
form, however, are not crucial in deriving the main result of the model; that is, 
the existence of an incentive for firms to engage in vertical integration for qual- 
ity signaling. See Section 5 for a detailed discussion of robustness of vertical 
integration for quality signaling. 
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The quality of each component can be either good or bad. We as- 
sume that a final product is useful to a consumer if and only if both x 
and y components are of good quality. The value of a useful final pro- 
duct is normalized to 1. A final product, with any of its component 
being bad will render zero value to its consumer.  
There are two types of firms, high (H) and low (L), in each sector, 
differ in their ability to produce a good quality component. More speci- 
fically, if a firm is H-type (L-type), it can produce a good component 
with probability qH (qL ) in period 1, with 1＞qH＞qL≥0. Per-period cost 
of producing a component is given by cH and cL for H-type and L-type 
firms, respectively, with cH＞cL＞0, implying that L-type firms have a 
cost advantage over those of H-type. This generates an incentive to be 
paired with L-type firms for the purpose of saving costs. 
The probability of each firm to make a good quality component in 
period 2 depends both on its type and on the quality of its component 
in period 1. For a θ-type firm with successful (failed) performance in 
period 1, qθS(qθF) denotes its probability of producing a good component 
in period 2, with 1≥qθS＞qθF≥0. If a θ-type firm does not produce any 
component in period 1, the probability of producing a high-quality 
component in period 2 is denoted by qθN, with qθN＜qθF. This inequality 
implies that a firm that does not produce in period 1 is penalized be- 
cause it lacks experience useful for period 2 production. Let δ∈[0, 1] 
denote the discount factor for the second-period payoff, which is com- 
mon for all firms. 
In the following analysis, we will focus on the case where the fol- 
lowing conditions are satisfied:
    
2 2( )   ( ) 2 0 max ( ) 2 , ,H H L L H L H La q c q c q q c c⎡ ⎤− > > − − −⎣ ⎦        
( )
( )   2 0
max 2 , max , .
HF HF H
LS LS L HS LS LS HS H L
b q q c
q q c q q q q c c
− > >
⎡ − − − ⎤⎣ ⎦         (A1)
 
The above conditions imply that it is socially desirable for HH pair to 
produce while it is socially undesirable for any pair that involves an 
L-type firm to produce in any period. 
Each firm recognizes its type and as well as the other firms’. Thus, 
we focus on incomplete information about firms’ types only on the con- 
sumer side. With regard to consumers’ information about firm types, 
we compare two cases. First, we consider the case where both sectors 
(A1)
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are new; that is, the types of firms in neither sector are known to 
consumers at the beginning of period 1. This is a situation in which 
firms have yet to establish their reputation. Consumers only know the 
proportion of types. The proportion of H-type firms in sector i is given 
by vi∈(0, 1) with i＝x, y. Second, we analyze the case in which only 
one of the two sectors, namely, sector x, is “mature,” that is, a sector 
of which consumers already know the types of firms at the beginning 
of period 1. This may be interpreted as a case in which all H-type 
firms in x sector have good brand names, while those in sector have 
not established yet so consumers only know the proportion of types in 
sector y in period 1. In the two-new sector case, firms can only use 
price to signal their types, which is referred to as price signaling; on 
the contrary, in the one-mature-one-new sector case, firms can use 
their brand name to signal their product’s quality, which is referred to 
as brand signaling. 
With regard to cross-sector matching between firms, three different 
cases of cross-sector proportions of H-type firms, vx＜vy, vx＝vy , and 
vx＞vy generate different matching possibilities, which in turn may 
affect the outcome of the model. These different matching possibilities 
influence the bargaining power between partner firms, thus their pay- 
offs.4 However, the necessary and sufficient condition for a separating 
equilibrium in which firm types are revealed to consumers, the focus of 
our analysis, does not depend on different matching possibilities. Thus, 
we focus on the case with vx＜vy , reflecting our presumption that 
brand names are likely to be a scarce resource. We also suppose that 
the matching process does not entail any search cost.
In contrast with Choi and Joen (2007) that focused on a short-term 
contract lasting for only one period, we assume that firms may use 
either a short-term contract or a long-term contract with their partners 
to subject them to be partners both in periods 1 and 2. At the end of 
each period, we assume that consumers can identify the true cause of 
failure: consumers can precisely observe the success or failure of each 
component after purchasing the product. Cho and Jeon (2007) referred 
this as a “no cross-sector inference problem” case because consumers 
have no problem in inferring the cause(s) of failure of their product.5  
4 See La and Park (2009), an earlier version of this paper, for the analysis of 
all three matching possibilities.
5 They also analyze the case where consumers cannot infer the cause(s) of 
failure of their product, namely the “cross-sector inference problem” case. To 
check the robustness of vertical integration for quality signaling over different 
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In the absence of any cross-sector inference problem, they showed that 
the necessary and sufficient condition for a separating equilibrium with 
price signaling is identical to the corresponding condition with brand 
signaling. In the following analysis, we focus on the no cross-sector in- 
ference problem case, demonstrating that the equivalence result between 
price and brand signaling largely depends on their exclusive focus on 
the case of a short-term contract.   
Each period is composed of five stages:
1. Firms search for their partners and are matched.
2. After matching, two firms decide whether to make a contract. If 
they decide not to, then they restart their costless search for part- 
ners (i.e., go back to stage 1). Otherwise, they make either a short- 
term or a long-term contract. 
3. The production takes place.
4. Each pair of firms is randomly matched to a consumer and makes 
a take-or-leave-it offer to the consumer. Each consumer decides 
whether to accept or to reject the offer. Before the offer, each pair 
of firms decides on the mode of signaling (either price or brand 
signaling) if brand signaling is an option.
5. After purchasing a product, consumers observe whether each com- 
ponent is of good or bad quality.
　　 
III. Benchmark Results under a Short-Term Contract
This section focuses on the case in which firms use a short-term 
contract with their partners, replicating the results of Choi and Jeon 
(2007). More specifically, we derive the necessary and sufficient condi- 
tion for a separating equilibrium in which firm types are revealed to 
consumers through price (or brand if available) signaling.
Period 2: To derive the condition for a separating equilibrium, we apply 
backward induction, describing first the equilibrium behavior in period 
2 while assuming that only H-type firms are able to sell in period 1.6 
assumptions on the consumers’ informational constraint, Section 5 analyzes the 
cross-sector inference problem case, establishing that an incentive to sign a 
long-term contract or to engage in vertical integration for quality signaling con- 
tinues to exist under this alternative assumption on the consumers’ inference 
capability.
6 Once firm types are revealed in a separating equilibrium, only pairs of H- 
type firms can make positive profits because the consumer’s maximum willing- 
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Let p2SF be a period-2 price charged by the partners composed of an H- 
type in sector x with a success record (represented by the first subscript, 
S of p
2
SF ) and an H-type in sector y with a failure record (represented 
by the second subscript F, of p
2




SF , and p
2
FF being simi- 
larly defined. Then, the no cross-sector inference problem assumption 
and sellers being on the short side of the market imply the following 
values for these prices in period 2:  
2 2 2 2 2 2( ) , , and ( ) .SS HS SF FS HS HF FF HFp q p p q q p q= = = =            (1)
Although firms can freely pair in period 2 after the expiration of short- 
term contract at the end of period 1, no firm with a success record has 
an incentive to be in partner with a firm with a failure record in period 
2. Such is “positive sorting” in which firms with the same record in 
period 1 match with each other in period 2. With the assumption of an 
equal division of revenue within an SS pair (a pair having success re- 
cords in period 1) and within an FF pair (a pair having failure records 











2}/2; this inequality 
implies that any deviation from positive sorting will yield a total payoff 
for a deviating pair that is strictly smaller than the sum of their 
individual payoffs under positive sorting, thereby forcing at least one of 
the deviating firms to have a strictly lower payoff. 
Period 1: Given the period-2 pricing behaviors and positive sorting 
described above, we can derive the condition for a separating equil- 
ibrium under two different signaling options, price and brand signaling. 
Prior to characterizing such conditions, we represent the present dis- 
counted value of a total joint payoff of a (short-term) pair composed of 
an i-type firm from sector x and a j-type firm from sector y with its 





   
1 1 2 2( ) 2 2 [ ( /2) (1 )( /2) ],HH HH HH H H SS H FF HV p p c q p q p cδ= − + + − −
   = = − −
1 1 1( ) ( )HL HH LH HH HH H LV p V p p c c
2 2[( )( /2) (2 )( /2) ],H L SS H L FF H Lq q p q q p c cδ+ + + − − − −     
(2)
ness to pay for a final product is lower than the production cost for all other 
types of pairs that include at least one L-type firm, as assumed in (A1).
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1 1 2 2( ) 2 2 [ ( /2) (1 )( /2) ].LL HH HH L L SS L FF LV p p c q p q p cδ= − + + − −
In order to support a separating equilibrium in which only pairs of 
H-type firms are productive, the following individual rationality (IR) and 
incentive compatibility (IC) conditions need to be satisfied:
   for the case in which both sectors are new,
   (IR
P)   ≥1( ) 0HH HHV p  and
   (IC
P)   = ≤ ≤1 1 1( ) ( ) 0 and ( ) 0,HL HH LH HH LL HHV p V p V p
   for the case in which sector x is mature and sector y is new,  (3)
   (IR
B)   ≥1( ) 0HH HHV p  and
   (IC
B)   ≥1 1( ) ( ),HH HH HL HHV p V p
with p1HH＝(qH)
2 under a separating equilibrium through brand sig- 
naling.7
For such a separating equilibrium, (IR) and (IC) are obviously neces- 
sary.8 Given these conditions, we can derive the following benchmark 
results for a separating equilibrium under a short-term contract, which 
replicates the results of Choi and Jeon (2007).
Benchmark Results 1. Given the set up described in Section 2, firms 
are assumed to sign a short-term contract when they match and pro- 
duce their components for a final product. 
a) When both sectors are new, a separating equilibrium through 





must hold by definition: if an HH pair can signal its type by the fact that an 
H-type firm of sector x is in its pair (branding signaling), then such an HH pair 
should be able to and will charge the consumer’s maximum willingness to pay 






 implies VHH (p
1
HH )＞0 from (A1), inducing 
VHH(p
1
HH )≥0 a redundant requirement.
8 VHH (p
1
HH )≥0 is necessary for market participation of an HH pair to be 




HH )≤0 and VLL (p
1
HH )≤0 are necessary to 
eliminate any L-type-involving pair’s incentive to masquerade an HH pair’s 
pricing behavior in period 1 when both sectors are new and there are some 
H-type firms that cannot pair with another H-type firm with vx＜vy. When sector 
x is mature, (IC) no longer concerns about an LL pair’s masquerading pos- 




HH ) is still necessary to eliminate the incentive of 
an H-type firm with a brand name to pair with an L-type firm, masquerading 
an HH pair’s behavior in period 1 with vx＜vy.
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b) When sector x is mature and sector y is new, a separating equi- 















Proof. See Appendix for the proof.
　　
When both sectors are new, HH pairs signal their types under a 
separating equilibrium by setting a low enough price in period 1 so no 
incentive for HL, LH, or LL pairs are formed, masquerading as an HH 
pair (by setting the same low price). On the one hand, any pair with 
an L-type firm has a cost advantage over a HH pair because cH－cL＞0. 
On the other hand, an HH pair has an advantage over the others 
because an H-type firm has a higher probability for successful com- 
ponent production in period 1 than an L-type firm (qH－qL＞0). In ad- 
dition, having a success record in period 1 enables a firm to set a higher 





FF＞0), implying a higher expected joint revenue of period 2 
for an HH pair. This higher expected joint revenue of period 2 may 
enable an HH pair to set a low enough price in period 1 to discourage 
other kinds of pairs to set the same low price. To support such price 
signaling as an equilibrium behavior, firms’ valuation for future payoffs 






FF )/2－ (cH－cL)]. Note that it is easier 
to meet this condition, the smaller the value of cH－cL and the bigger 





When sector x is mature and sector y is new, the necessary and 
sufficient condition for a separating equilibrium is the same as in the 




. This may seem surprising 
because consumers know more about firm types when sector x is ma- 
ture than when both sectors are new, possibly facilitating HH pairs’ 
signaling their types.10 The assumption of no cross-sector inference 
problem plays a key role in generating this equivalence result.11 In the 
9 See Cho and Kreps (1987) for the definition and use of “Cho-Kreps refinement 
criterion.”
10 In fact, (3) partially confirms this intuition: Given (IR), (ICP) implies (ICB) 
but the reverse is not necessarily true.
11 In the presence of a cross-sector inference problem, Choi and Jeon (2007) 
showed that the necessary and sufficient condition for a separating equilibrium 
VERTICAL INTEGRATION FOR QUALITY SIGNALING 543
absence of any cross-sector inference problem, consumers can correctly 
infer each firm’s performance in period 1 so that such performance 
affects its own payoff in period 2 but does not affect its partner’s. This 
implies that each firm’s expected individual payoff in period 2 is in- 
dependent of its partner’s type in period 1, which in turn makes each 
firm’s net gain from pairing with an H-type rather than with an L-type 









HH). As an H-type does not have any 
stronger incentive to pair with an H-type than an L-type firm has, the 
fact that consumers know a brand firm’s type does not make its sig- 
naling for pairing with another H-type firm any easier than a no-brand 
H-type firm’s signaling for such pairing.12
This equivalence result, however, does not imply that brand names 
do not have a role in the market. A firm with a brand name does 










HH)≥0, consumers will believe that an H-type firm in sector x has 
an incentive to pair with another H-type firm in sector y in period 1. In 
that case, an H-type firm with a brand name can set p
1
HH being equal 











from (A1), an H-type firm with a brand name sets a higher price than 
that without a brand name in period 1, realizing a higher expected 
is weaker (i.e., easier to be satisfied) under brand signaling than under price 
signaling. If consumers cannot figure out which component has contributed to 
the failure of a final product, an H-type firm has a stronger incentive to pair 
with an H-type firm than an L-type firm has for such pairing in period 1. This 
is because the increased likelihood of a success of its final product in period 1 
from pairing with an H-type firm rather than with an L-type implies a higher 
expected individual payoff of period 2. Such an increase in the likelihood of a 
success in period 1 is higher for a H-type firm with qH(qH－qL)＞qL(qH－qL). 
Because consumers know that an H-type firm has a stronger incentive to pair 
with an H-type firm than an L-type firm has, an H-type firm with a brand name 
can more easily signal that it is paring with another H-type firm than an H-type 
with no brand name can.













HH)＞0 implies that VHH 
(p1HH)－VLL(p
1
HH)＞0. As shown in the proof, the former inequality is the neces- 
sary and the sufficient condition for a separating equilibrium under brand sig- 
naling. The satisfaction of the former inequality implies both former and latter 
inequalities, the necessary and the sufficient condition for a separating equilib- 
rium under price signaling, implying the equivalence result.
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payoff under a separating equilibrium. 
IV. A Long-Term Production Relationship for Quality 
Signaling
Benchmark Results 1 in the previous section have demonstrated that 
an H-type firm with a brand name cannot use its name value (i.e., its 
type being already known to be H-type) as its leverage to convince its 
consumer that it is pairing with another H-type firm in the absence of 
any cross-sector inference problem. Although this is a surprising result, 
the analysis of the previous section exclusively focuses on a short-term 
production relationship between firms. This section explores the pos- 
sibility of utilizing a long-term contract or vertical integration as a way 
to signal firm types. First, we assume that firms can sign a long-term 
contract that forces partner firms in period 1 to continue their partner- 
ship in period 2. The comparison of outcomes between those under a 
longer-term and those under a short-term contract is discussed. In the 
following subsection, we analyze the enforceability of a long-term con- 
tract and suggest vertical integration with relation-specific investment 
as an alternative way to commit to a long-term production relationship. 
A. A Separating Equilibrium under a Long-Term Contract 
In this subsection, firms are assumed to sign a long-term contract 
under which paired firms in period 1 should continue their partnership 
in period 2. Given this assumption, the necessary and sufficient con- 
dition is derived for a separating equilibrium in which only HH pairs 
are productive. To derive the condition for such a separating equilib- 
rium, backward induction is applied, in which the equilibrium behavior 
in period 2 is described first.








FF be defined in the same way as in 
Section 3. Each represents a period-2 price set by a pair of firms with 
a different combination of records for their period-1 component produc- 
tion. Once again, the assumptions of no cross-sector inference problem 
and sellers being on the short side of the market imply the following 
values for these prices in period 2:  
2 2 2 2 2 2( ) , , and ( ) .SS HS SF FS HS HF FF HFp q p p q q p q= = = =           (4)
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Because of a long term contract signed in period 1, re-matching 
among firms will not occur in period 2. As a result, “positive sorting” 
will not take place. With the assumption of (A1), all four possible types 
of pairs, namely, SS, SF, FS, and FF pairs, exist in terms of their 
success/failure records for period-1 component production, and sell their 
products in period 2. 
Period 1: Given the period-2 prices described above, we can derive the 
necessary and sufficient condition for a separating equilibrium under 
different signaling options. We represent the present discounted value 
of a total joint payoff of a long-term pair composed of an i-type firm 







denoting its period-1 price:  
   
1 1 2 2 2
2 2
( ) 2 {( ) 2 (1 )
              (1 ) 2 },
I
HH HH HH H H SS H H SF
H FF H
V p p c q p q q p
q p c
δ= − + + −
+ − −
   
1 1 1 2
2 2
( ) ( ) { [ (1 )
              (1 )] (1 )(1 ) },  and 
I I
HL HH LH HH HH H L H L SS H L
L H SF H L FF H L
V p V p p c c q q p q q
q q p q q p c c
δ= = − − + + −
+ − + − − − −      
(5)
 
   
1 1 2 2 2
2 2
( ) 2 {( ) 2 (1 )
             (1 ) 2 }.
I
LL HH HH L L SS L L SF
L FF L
V p p c q p q q p
q p c
δ= − + + −
+ − −
In order to support a separating equilibrium in which only HH pairs 
are productive under a long-term contract, the following individual ra- 
tionality (IRI) and incentive compatibility (ICI) conditions need to be sat- 
isfied:
  for the case of both sectors being new,
  (IR
IP) ≥1( ) 0 and,IHH HHV p
  (IC
IP) = ≤ ≤1 1 1( ) ( ) 0 and ( ) 0,I I IHL HH LH HH LL HHV p V p V p
  for the case of sector x being mature and sector y being new,   (6)
  (IR
IB) ≥1( ) 0 and,IHH HHV p
  (IC
IB) ≥1 1( ) ( ),I IHH HH HL HHV p V p
with p1HH＝(qH)
2 under a separating equilibrium through brand signaling.
One can easily check that (IR
I) and (ICI) are identical to (IR) and (IC) 
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in Section 3, with Vij(p
1




HH). With these (IR
I) 
and (IC
I) conditions, the following Proposition 1 can be derived for a 
separating equilibrium under a long-term contract:  
Proposition 1. Given the set up described in Section 2, firms are 
assumed to sign a long-term contract when they match and produce 
their components for a final product. 
a) When both sectors are new, a separating equilibrium through 










































































b) When sector x is mature and sector y is new, a separating equi- 





































Proof. See Appendix for the proof.
　　
For Proposition 1, we can provide explanations similar to those for 
Benchmark Results 1 of Section 3. Under a long-term contract, pairing 
with an H-type firm rather than with an L-type firm continues to gen- 
erate a higher expected joint revenue of period 2. This is because an 
H-type firm has a higher probability of producing a good component in 
period 1, and a partner firm’s success record in period 1 will raise the 
consumer’s willingness to pay for a final product in period 2. If δ is 
higher than a critical level (i.e., firms’ valuation of their period-2 payoff 
relative to their period-1 payoff is high enough), this benefit of a higher 
expected joint revenue of period 2 from pairing with an H-type can 
dominate the higher cost disadvantage of such pairing. This enables an 
HH pair to signal its type either by setting a low enough price in period 
1 (price signaling) or by relying on the fact that one of the pairing 
firms is a known H-type firm (brand signaling). Proposition 1 specifies 
such a critical level of δ for price signaling in (a), denoting it by δC
IP, 
and for brand signaling in (b), denoting it by δC
IB
. 





 because (qH＋qL)/2＜qH, yielding the following 
corollary to Proposition 1: 
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Corollary 1. If firms sign a long-term contract when they match and 
produce their components for a final product, the necessary and suf- 
ficient condition for a separating equilibrium is easier to be satisfied 
under brand signaling than under pricing signaling, with δC
IB＜δC
IP. 
This result is in contrast with Section 3’s benchmark results under 
a short-term contract, in which brand names do not relax the necessary 
and sufficient condition for a separating equilibrium. If two firms sign 
a long-term contract in period 1, they cannot participate in the re- 
matching process in period 2; hence, each firm’s performance in period 
1 affects not only its own payoff in period 2 but also its partner’s. As a 
result, an H-type firm’s net gain from pairing with an H-type firm rath- 
er than with an L-type firm in period 1 is greater than an L-type firm’s 

















hence, a more productive firm gains more from pairing with a more 
productive firm under a long-term contract. Because a H-type firm has 
a stronger incentive to pair with another H-type firm than an L-type 
firm has for such pairing under a long-term contract, an H-type firm 
with a brand name can use its brand as leverage in convincing its 
consumer that it is forming an HH pair.
Signing a long-term contract may give an H-type firm with a brand 
name the leverage to convince its consumer about its partner being 
another H-type. However, whether firms would have a reason to sign 
an actual long-term contract remains unclear. This is because a long- 
term contract prohibits positive sorting in period 2, decreasing an HH 







HH). Therefore, firms will sign a long-term 
contract only when it is necessary for generating a separating equili- 
brium. Such situation can occur if the necessary and sufficient condi- 
tion for a separating equilibrium is weaker under a long-term contract 
than under a short-term one. 
As shown in the proofs of Benchmark Results 1 and Proposition 1, 
the necessary and sufficient condition for a separating equilibrium through 
price signaling is 
1 1 2 2( ) ( ) 2(1 )( ) ( )( ) 0, andHH HH LL HH H L H L SS FFV p V p c c q q P Pδ δ− = − + − + − − ≥
1 1( ) ( ) 2(1 )( )I IHH HH LL HH H LV p V p c cδ− = − + −
        (7)
                     
2 2
2
( )[( ) 2( 1)
( 2) )] 0,
H L H L SS H L SF
H L FF
q q q q P q q P
q q P
δ+ − + − + −
+ + − ≥
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under a short-term and under a long-term contract, respectively. Simi- 
larly, the necessary and sufficient condition for a separating equilibrium 
through brand signaling is
1 1
2 2
( ) ( ) (1 )( )
( )( )/2 0, and
HH HH HL HH H L
H L SS FF
V p V p c c
q q P P
δ
δ
− = − + −
+ − − ≥
     (8)
1 1
2 2 2 2 2
( ) ( ) 2(1 )( )
( )[ ( 2 ) ] 0,
I I
HH HH HL HH H L
H L H SS SF FF SF FF
V p V p c c
q q q P P P P P
δ
δ
− = − + −
+ − − + + − ≥
under a short-term and under a long-term contract, respectively. Note 
the following relationships between these conditions:
      
1 1 1 1
2 2 2
( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )]
( )( 1)( 2 ), and
I I
HH HH LL HH HH HH LL HH
H L H L SS SF FF
V p V p V p V p
q q q q P P Pδ
− − − =
− + − − +
     (9)
      
1 1 1 1
2 2 2
( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )]
( )( 1/2)( 2 ).
I I
HH HH HL HH HH HH HL HH
H L H SS SF FF
V p V p V p V p
q q q P P Pδ
− − − =
− − − +






FF＞0 from (A1), (9) implies that
        − − − >
1 1 1 1( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )] 0I IHH HH LL HH HH HH LL HHV p V p V p V p  
                   if and only if qH＋qL＞1, and
        − − − >
1 1 1 1( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )] 0I IHH HH HL HH HH HH HL HHV p V p V p V p              
(10)
                   if and only if qH＞1/2, 
which in turn implies the following results:  
Proposition 2. Assume that the set up is defined as in Section 2. 
a) When both sectors are new, the necessary and sufficient condition 
for a separating equilibrium through price signaling is weaker under 
a long-term contract than under a short-term one iff qH＋qL＞1. 
b) When sector x is mature and sector y is new, the necessary and 
sufficient condition for a separating equilibrium through brand sig- 
naling is weaker under a long-term contract than under a short- 
term one iff qH＞1/2. 
　　
Proposition 2 implies that extending the length of a contract can 
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facilitate H-type firms’ signaling only when qH＋qL＞1 under price sig- 
naling and qH＞1/2 under brand signaling. If qH≤1/2, for example, an 
H-type firm with a brand name does not have a reason to sign a long- 
term contract to signal that it is pairing with another H-type firm despite 
the leverage creating effect of a long-term contract demonstrated by 
Corollary 1. As shown in (8), an H-type firm’s net gain from pairing 
with another H-type firm rather than with an L-type firm in period 1, 
increases in qH－qL under both types of contracts. This implies that 
generating a separating equilibrium is easier for an H-type firm with a 
brand name, the bigger the difference between qH and qL. After con- 
trolling this difference (i.e., holding qH－qL at a fixed level), note that a 
decrease in qH does not reduce an H-type firm’s net gain from pairing 
with a more productive partner under a short-term contract, but the 
same decrease in qH does reduce the net gain under a long-term con- 
tract: a less productive firm gets less from pairing with a more produc- 
tive partner.13 If qH gets smaller than 1/2, then the necessary and suf- 
ficient condition for a separating equilibrium becomes more difficult to 
satisfy under a long-term contract than under a short-term one, thus 
providing no incentive for an H-type firm with a brand name to sign a 
costly long-term contract to generate a separating equilibrium.14 We 
can provide a similar explanation for why H-type firms would not sign 
a long-term contract if qH＋qL≤1 in the absence of brand names.  
According to Proposition 2, a long-term contract is more likely for 
quality signaling in the presence of brand names than in their absence. 
This is because qH＋qL＞1 implies qH＞1/2, but the reverse is not true, 
with qH＞qL. It is also worthwhile to note that qH＋qL＞1 will not hold 
when qL gets too small, but qH＞1/2 is not affected by such a reduction 
in qL. Thus, even when the success rate of an L-type firm is very low 
in period 1, eliminating the possibility of a long-term contract being 
signed under price signaling, an H-type firm with a brand name may 
still have an incentive to sign a long-term contract as long as its suc- 
13 Under a short-term contract, recall that each firm’s net gain from pairing 
up with a more productive firm does not depend on its own type because each 
firm’s individual performance in period 1 does not affect its period-1 partner’s 
period-2 payoff as firms rematch through positive sorting in period 2. In 
contrast, each firm’s net gain from such pairing does depend on its own type 
under a long-term contract, having each firm’s net gain get higher, the higher 
the probability of its success in period 1.






HH) because firms cannot engage in profitable 
positive sorting in period 2 under a long-term contract.
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cess rate in period 1 is higher than 1/2. 
Using Proposition 2 together other results in our paper, we can con- 
sider various situations in which signing a long-term contract, possibly 
with a brand name, plays a crucial role in creating a market for a 
certain product by enabling a separating equilibrium. With regard to a 
foreign multinational firm’s entry into a local market, for example, con- 




) and qH＋qL＞1.15 Although signing a long-term contract relaxes the 
necessary and sufficient condition for a separating equilibrium through 
price signaling since qH＋qL＞1 (Proposition 2a), local H-type firms 
without brand names cannot generate a separating equilibrium even if 
they sign a long-term contract because δ＜δC
IP
 (Proposition 1a). In the 





qH＋qL＞1 imply that no separating equilibrium can emerge through 
partnership between local firms. If a foreign multinational firm in 
sector x has a brand name, then it may consider entering the local 
market by making a partnership with a local firm. Note that even such 
a multinational firm with a brand name cannot generate a separating 
equilibrium if it signs a short-term contract with a local firm. This is 
because its brand name under a short-term contract does not create 
any leverage to convince consumers of its formation of an HH pair, as 
shown in the Benchmark Result 1.16 With δ＞δC
IB
, however, a multina- 
tional firm with a brand name can generate a separating equilibrium 
by signing a long-term contract with a local firm. This implies creation 
of a market for a product of an HH pair, in which consumers are 
willing to pay a high price for the brand name. 
　　
B. Enforceability of a Long-Term Contract and Vertical Integration 
for Quality Signaling 
While Propositions 1 and 2 demonstrate that signing a long-term 
contract instead of a short-term one can facilitate H-type firms’ signaling 
15 As an example of this situation, we discuss the history of Korean whole life 
insurance market in Section 5.C. Prior to allowing foreign multinational firms’ 
entry in life insurance market in 1988, the development in Korean market of 
sophisticated whole life insurance programs has been very limited.
16 According to Proposition 2 (a), note that qH＋qL＞1 implies δCIP＜δCP. In 
addition, Benchmark Results 1 implies δCB＝δCP, which further implies δ＜δCIP
＜δCB. Finally, note that δ＜δCIP＜δCB is compatible with δCIB＜δ＜δCIP because qH＋
qL＞1 implies qH＞1/2.
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of forming an HH pair to consumers, we have not questioned enforce- 
ability of a long-term contract by simply assuming it. Signing a long- 
term contract in period 1, however, does not necessarily guarantee that 
signing firms will continue to be partners in period 2. This is due to 
the positive gain that such firms may collectively obtain by voiding their 
contract to be long-term partners and engaging in positive sorting in 
period 2. 
For partner firms that realize different outcomes in their component 
production (i.e., one firm succeeds while the other fails) in period 1, 




FS＝qHS qHF if they 
continue partnership.17 If such a pair of firms decides to void its long- 
term contract and re-match with another pair of firms that had just 
the opposite outcomes in period 1, then the total joint revenue that 









2＞2qHS qHF, voiding a long-term 
contract and re-matching through positive sorting will generate a net 
positive gain for such pairs. Thus, firms signing a long-term contract 
may suffer from time inconsistency, which would then nullify any 
potential signaling effect of a long-term contract.
An existence of a cost associated with voiding a long-term contract, 
however, may restore the credibility of a long-term production relation- 
ship. The maximum net benefit that any two pairs of firms can realize 
through positive sorting in period 2 is (qHS－qHF)
2,18 we can state the 
following result:   
　　
Proposition 3. Assume the existence of a cost of voiding a long-term 
contract, denoted by F, that is common for any pair of firms. If F＞ 
(qHS－qHF )
2/2, a long-term contract is enforceable.  
17 With regard to consumers’ willingness to pay for a product in period 2, 
consumers are assumed to believe that only H-type firms are productive in 
period 1. Because we are still interested in obtaining the condition for a sep- 
arating equilibrium, we continue such an assumption when we explicitly consider 
enforceability of a long-term contract.
18 Prior to any re-matching in period 2, we can denote different types of 
paired firms according to paired firms’ production records in period 1 by SS, 
SF, FS, FF, with the first (second) letter denoting the production record of a 
firm in sector x (y) and S (F) representing a success (failure) record. Then, there 
exist following six different combinations of re-matching possibilities among any 
two pairs of firms in period 2: (SS, FF), (SS, SF), (SS, FS), (FF, FS), (FF, SF), 
and (SF, FS). It is easy to check that only (SF, FS) may strictly benefit from re- 
matching, realizing a net benefit of (qHS)
2＋(qHF)
2－2qHS qHF＝(qHS－qHF)
2, as shown 
in the preceding paragraph.
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One way to create a cost of voiding a long-term contract is to require 
contracting firms to pay a third party, such as a local court, a fee that 
is greater than (qHS－qHF )
2/2 if they void their long-term contract in 
period 2.19 To convince consumers of the enforceability of a long-term 
contract, firms also need to publicize its existence. In practice, however, 
publicizing an inter-firm contract can be difficult as it may contain 
sensitive information, of which public revelation can be costly for con- 
tracting parties. 
　　
Vertical Integration for Quality Signaling
Given these potential difficulties in utilizing a long-term contract as 
a signaling device, H-type firms may consider vertical integration as an 
alternative way to signal that they are in a credible long-term produc- 
tion relationship. Vertical integration among firms often involves relation- 
specific investment that is irreversible or only partially reversible, poten- 
tially making future break-up a costly choice for integrating parties.20 
If the cost associated with breaking up a vertically integrated firm is 
higher than (qHS－qHF )
2/2 in our model, then firms can credibly signal 
their long-term production relationship by vertical integration. Thus, our 
model suggests the possibility of forming a vertically integrated firm in 
which relation-specific investment is mainly for convincing the consumers 
about long-term relationship among its production units, which in turn 
would signal that its production units are H-type. 
To illustrate the possibility of vertical integration for quality signaling, 
we construct a simple example of relation-specific investment that elim- 
inates firms’ ex post incentive for positive-sorting. 
An Example of Relation-Specific Investment to Block Positive Sorting
The following relation-specific investment on a y-sector firm in period 
1 will raise its probability of making a good component in period 2 
only when its component is combined with a component of its period-1 
19 Any contractual arrangement involving only two firms that sign a long-term 
contract will also suffer from time inconsistency. This is because such firms can 
always come up with a re-arrangement in period 2 under which both of them 
can be strictly better off whenever they can gain from positive sorting in period 
2. To eliminate the possibility of such an ex post re-arrangement among con- 
tracting firms, an enforceable long-term contract needs to include a thirty party 
who will implement the long-term contract. 
20 As discussed in the introduction, extensive literature on vertical integration 
and associated relation-specific investments exists.
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partner. Denote such a raised probability of producing a good com- 
ponent in period 2 by q̂HS(＞qHS) after a success record in period 1 and 
by q̂HF(＞qHF ) after a failure record. If the following condition in (11) is 
satisfied, then a pair of H-type firms that make such relation-specific 
investment in period 1 will not have any incentive to break up for posi- 
tive sorting in period 2:
ˆHF HS HS HF HF HF HS HSq q q q q q q q+ > +  and              
(11)
             ˆ .HS HF HF HS HF HF HS HSq q q q q q q q+ > +
Recall that the incentive to break up for positive sorting in period 2 
arises only when paired firms realize different outcomes in their com- 
ponent production in period 1 and such a pair meets with another pair 
of firms that had opposite outcomes in period 1. This continues to be 
true even when the y-sector firm’s probability of making a good com- 
ponent in period 2 increases due to the relation-specific investment. 
The expressions on the left side of the inequalities in (11) represent the 
total joint revenue of two pairs of firms if they do not break up in 
period 2 and the expressions on the right side represent the total joint 
revenue of the same pairs of firms if they do break up for positive 
sorting. While the relation-specific investment would raise the presented 
discounted value of total joint revenue of a pair of H-type firms, the 
cost of such investment can be higher than the increase in the ex- 
pected revenue, yielding a negative return on the investment. Even when 
the relation-specific investment yields a negative return, note that a 
pair of H-type firms may still make such investment to convince its 
consumers of their commitment to a long-term relationship if such com- 
mitment is necessary for them to signal their HH partnership.
To consider the relation-specific investment that is mainly for con- 
vincing consumers of a long-term production relationship, assume that 
the investment described above yields a negative return. Now, recall 
that vx＜vy, thus a y-sector firm has no bargaining power with its x- 
sector partner in period 1; that is, a y-sector firm would sign any con- 
tract with an x-sector firm in period 1 as long as it guarantees a non- 
negative payoff.21 An x-sector firm, based on such bargaining power, may 
21 Note that a y-sector firm would sign any contract with a x-sector firm in 
period 1 as long as it guarantees a non-negative (expected discounted) payoff 
does not contradict with Section 3’s assumption of an equal division of revenue 
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offer the following long-term contract to a y-sector firm in period 1: the 
x-sector firm will provide the relation-specific investment for the y- 
sector firm in period 1, but the x-sector firm will only provide a pay- 
ment to the y-sector firm just enough to compensate its marginal cost 
of production in both periods. It is hard to distinguish such a long- 
term contract from vertical integration because the contract practically 
deprives the y-sector firm of its right to exercise ownership over its asset, 
except for being compensated for its cost of producing the component 
good for the x-sector firm. Even when the y-sector firm is known to be 
an H-type firm in period 2, the long-term contract will prohibit the y- 
sector firm from using its brand power to realize any positive gain from 
it.22 In addition, the x-sector firm makes relation-specific investment into 
the y-sector firm (or into its asset) to improve the latter’s productivity―
this usually takes place within a firm. Signing such a long-term contract, 
is equivalent to an x-sector firm’s vertically integrating a y-sector firm 
with the relation-specific investment.23
This signaling motivation for vertical integration suggested by our 
analysis is quite different from existing explanations for vertical in- 
tegration. As discussed in the introduction, previous studies explain 
the occurrence of vertical integration based on various reasons, such 
as a way to induce optimal relation-specific investment in the context 
of an incomplete contract, as a way to maneuver strategic actions under 
imperfect competition, and so on. In the given example of relation- 
specific investment, note that the investment yields a negative return, 
thus the primary reason for vertical integration with such investment 
is to signal that firms are forming an HH pair by credibly committing 
to a long-term production relationship.
within a SS pair and a FF pair after firms’ types being revealed to consumers in 
period 2. In expectation of an equal division of revenue in period 2, which will 
generate some positive profit to a y-sector firm in period 2, a x-sector firm may 
offer a y-sector firm a contract that gives the y-sector firm a negative profit in 
period 1 so that its overall expected discounted profit is just equal to zero.
22 Under a short-term contract, the relation-specific investment will strengthen 
the y-sector firm’s bargaining power even further. This is because its x-sector 
partner in period 1 will have an incentive to keep their partnership due to the 
y-sector firm’s increased probability of success in period 2, which implies a 
higher joint revenue in period 2 if they continue to be partners.
23 Because the long-term contract is practically equivalent to vertical integra- 
tion in its contents, we acknowledge that firms do not strictly prefer vertical 
integration over the long-term contract in the above example.
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V. Robustness of Vertical Integration for Quality 
Signaling and Possible Examples 
To test robustness of the result of vertical integration for quality sig- 
naling over alternative assumptions, the case of a cross-sector inference 
problem, as well as the discussion on other robustness-related issues, 
is presented in this section. The last subsection provides examples of 
vertical integration for quality signaling.
A. The Cross-Sector Inference Problem Case    
To analyze the case of a cross-sector inference problem, we continue 
to assume the same set up as the one in Section 2, except assuming 
that consumers cannot infer the cause of failure of their products. First, 
we consider the case of short-term contract, indentifying the necessary 
and sufficient condition for a separating equilibrium. As shown by Choi 
and Jeon (2007), the prices in period 2 are:
= = = +
+ +
2
2 2 2 2 ( )( ) , , and
1 1
H HS HS HF
SS HS SF FS
H H
q q q qp q p p
q q            
(12) 












Given these prices, the following benchmark results are obtained for 
the case of a cross-sector inference problem by utilizing the same indi- 
vidual rationality and incentive compatibility conditions as those in Sec- 
tion 3:  
Benchmark Results 2. Given the set up described in Section 2, except 
that consumers cannot infer the cause(s) of failure of their products, 
firms are assumed to sign a short-term contract when they match and 
24 Note that we obtain p
2
FF in (12) by focusing on the most efficient equi- 
librium in which among the firms with a failure record, the successful pro- 
ducers of component x are matched with the successful producers of com- 
ponent y and similarly for the producers of failed components. p
2
FS in (12) 
represents consumers’ maximum willingness to pay for a final product produced 
by a pair of a success-record firm and a failure-record firm, if consumers expect 
that the firm with a failure record is randomly chosen for matching with a 




FF)/2, implying that positive sorting will 
arise in period-2 matching.
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produce their components for a final product. 
a) When both sectors are new, a separating equilibrium through price 
signaling exists iff δ≥δC
P




b) When sector x is mature and sector y is new, a separating equi- 






Proof. See Appendix for the proof. 
To investigate whether signing a long-term contract or vertically inte- 
grating with relation-specific investment can facilitate H-type firms’ sig- 
naling in the presence of a cross-sector inference problem, we now con- 
sider the long-term contract case, indentifying the corresponding neces- 
sary and sufficient condition for a separating equilibrium. Given that 
firms credibly commit to a long-term production relationship in period 
1, only two types of prices exist in period 2, namely, the price of a pair 
with a success record in period 1 and the price of a pair with a failure 
record in period 1, as consumers cannot infer the cause(s) of failure of 




S be a period-2 price charged by a pair of H-types 
with a success record and p2F
L
F be a period-2 price charged by a pair of 
H-types with a failure record; the superscript 2L denotes the period-2 
price of a pair of firms in a long-term production relationship. Sellers 
being on the short side of the market implies the following values for 




2 2 2 2 ( ) (1 )( )( ) and .
1 1
L L H HS HF H HF
SS HS FF
H H
q q q q qp q p








F, which results from the commitment to a long- 
term production relationship that blocks formation of the most efficient 
equilibrium among the firms with failure records that had been feasible 
under a short-term contract.25 As shown later, this difference in period- 
25 Footnote 24 describes formation of the most efficient equilibrium among 
firms with failure record. Similar to the case of no cross-sector inference 
problem analyzed in Section 4, firms that signed a long-term contract in the 
presence of a cross-sector inference problem may also have an incentive to void 
the long-term contract and form the most efficient equilibrium in the case of 
obtaining a failure record in period 1. Again, firms can overcome such a 
potential time-inconsistency problem either by credibly creating a fixed cost 
associated with voiding the long-term contract or by making relation-specific 
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2 pricing may enable H-type firms to signal their types by committing 
to a long-term production relationship. As in Section 4, the present 
discounted value of a total joint payoff of a long-term pair composed of 







HH denoting its period-1 price:
    δ= − + + − −
1 1 2 2 2 2( ) 2 {( ) [1 ( ) ] 2 },I L LHH HH HH H H SS H FF HV p p c q p q p c
    
1 1 1 2
2
( ) ( ) [
(1 ) ],
I I L
HL HH LH HH HH H L H L SS
L
H L FF H L
V p V p p c c q q p
q q p c c
δ= = − − +
+ − − −                 (14)
    δ= − + + − −
1 1 2 2 2 2and  ( ) 2 {( ) [1 ( ) ] 2 }.I L LLL HH HH L L SS L FF LV p p c q p q p c
In consideration of these present discounted values of different types 
of long-term pairs, the following proposition for the case of a cross- 
sector inference problem can be obtained by utilizing the same indivi- 
dual rationality and incentive compatibility conditions as those in Sec- 
tion 4:
Proposition 4. Given the set up described in Section 2, except that 
consumers cannot infer the cause(s) of failure of their product, firms 
are assumed to sign a long-term contract when they match and produce 
their components for a final product. 
a) When both sectors are new, a separating equilibrium through price 




2 2 2 2
2( )(1 ) .
( )( ){ [( ) 2 ( ) ] [( ) ( ) ]} 2(1 )( )
H L H
H L H L H HS HS HF HF HS HF H H L
c c q
q q q q q q q q q q q q c c
− +≡
+ − − + + − − + −
b) When sector x is mature and sector y is new, a separating equilib- 




2 2 2 2
( )(1 ) .
( ){ [( ) 2 ( ) ] [( ) ( ) ]} (1 )( )
BL H L H
CI
H H L H HS HS HF HF HS HF H H L
c c q
q q q q q q q q q q q c c
δ − +≡
− − + + − − + −













, the following proposition of 
investment, similar to the ones described in Section 4.
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vertical integration for quality signaling in the presence of a cross-sector 
inference problem can be obtained:
Proposition 5. The set up is defined as in Section 2, except that 
consumers cannot infer the cause(s) of failure of their product. 
a) When both sectors are new, the necessary and sufficient condition 
for a separating equilibrium through price signaling is weaker under 







b) When sector x is mature and sector y is new, the necessary and 
sufficient condition for a separating equilibrium through brand sig- 
naling is weaker under a long-term contract than under a short- 






.   
According to Proposition 5 (a), committing to a long-term production 
relationship enables firms without a brand name to convince consumers 






I ). Similarly, Proposition 5 (b) 
shows that a firm with a brand name can restore its leverage to con- 
vince consumers that it is pairing with an H-type firm by committing 






I ). Thus, Propositions 2 and 5 
establish that the result of vertical integration for quality signaling is 
robust over different assumptions of consumers’ ability to infer the 
cause(s) of failure of products. In fact, the necessary and sufficient 
condition for a separating equilibrium in the presence of a cross-sector 
inference problem is always weaker under a long-term contract than 
under a short-term one regardless of the firms’ probability of producing 
quality components. This contrasts with Proposition 2 in the absence 
of any cross-sector inference problem.26
B. Other Robustness-Related Issues    
The basic setup of the model described in Section 2 utilizes several 
simplifying assumptions, such as homogenous consumers, sellers’ being 
on the short side of the market, and the existence of 2 periods only. 
Fully relaxing these assumptions, a means to check the robustness of 
vertical integration for quality signaling, is beyond the scope of this 
26 A referee suggested that the paper would be more convincing if we can 
show that the signaling motivation of vertical integration remains robust when 
we relax the assumption that consumers can observe individual firms’ perfor- 
mance. We thank the referee for the comment, which led us to conduct this 
robustness check in Section 5.A.
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paper. Nevertheless, we discuss issues associated with relaxing these 
assumptions in this subsection; herein, we provide our conjecture on 
how such relaxation might affect the result of this study. 
The assumptions of homogenous consumers and sellers’ being on 
the short-side of the market simplify our analysis by making the 
period-2 price of a final product depending only on the performance of 
firms in period 1. These assumptions also allow us to focus on the 
issue of signaling in the presence of incomplete information of firms’ 
types, by eliminating strategic concerns among H-type pairs in setting 
the quantity (or, equivalently the price) of their products. One possible 
way to introduce heterogeneity among consumers is to consider a mo- 
nopolistic competition model in which each pair of firms behaves as if 
they are a monopolist, thus we can continue to disregard the potential 
strategic concerns among H-type pairs in setting the prices of their final 
products. In such a setup, if H-type pairs can signal their types either 
through setting low enough prices or through their brand names, we 
can check if committing to a long-term production relationship could 
either facilitate or not the firms’ signaling their types, in a manner 
similar to the one conducted in this paper. The cost and benefit associ- 
ated with committing to a long-term relationship in such a model would 
be similar to the ones analyzed in this paper. Hence, we conjecture that 
the result of vertical integration for quality signaling would continue to 
hold in such a model with heterogeneous consumers.
Having only 2 periods is another simplifying assumption of our model. 
One may consider introducing additional periods into the model, poten- 
tially considering a model with infinite horizon. Given the setup of our 
model, we conjecture that introducing additional periods into the model 
would not affect the main result of our paper; that is, the existence of 
an incentive for vertical integration for quality signaling. For example, 
consider the case of no cross-sector inference problem with three periods 
to produce and consume final products. As the performance record in 
the second period would affect the likelihood of a successful perfor- 
mance in the third period, the third-period prices would be determined 
accordingly. With the third-period prices properly calculated, we may 
derive the present discounted value of a total joint payoff of the partner 
firms in the first period, with which we can characterize the necessary 
and sufficient condition for a separating equilibrium. If we continue to 
assume that pairing with a firm that has been inactive in the first period 
does not pay off, then the condition for a separating equilibrium would 
be relevant only for the first period. This is similar to the current model 
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with 2 periods. Committing to a long-term relationship will generate a 
cost similar to the case of the 2-period model, and such commitment 
can relax the necessary and sufficient condition under certain situa- 
tions; a pair of H-type firms would have a lower joint expected payoff 
by committing to a long-term relationship but the reduction in the joint 
expected payoff can be bigger if such commitment is to pair with an L- 
type firm. Adding more periods, possibly infinitely, may further compli- 
cate the expressions for the total joint payoff of a pair of firms in the 
first period and the corresponding necessary and sufficient condition for 
a separating equilibrium. Nevertheless, there seems to be no reason for 
us to expect that having more periods will undermine the signaling in- 
centive to sign a long-term contract, especially when firms can choose 
the duration of their contract.
The above discussion and the preceding subsection demonstrate that 
the result of vertical integration for signaling quality can be robust over 
different assumptions of the model, such as heterogeneous consumers, 
multiple periods, and consumers’ having a cross-sector inference pro- 
blem. This, of course, implies neither a signaling incentive for vertical 
integration will always exist nor generalizing the current model will not 
yield any interesting result. Possible ways to extend our current model 
are discussed in the concluding section.      
C. Possible Examples of Vertical Integration for Quality Signaling 
To provide possible examples of vertical integration for quality sig- 
naling, we discuss three cases of vertical integration. In the examples 
discussed below, firms engage in aggressive advertisement campaigns 
that emphasize their vertically-integrated production units as the com- 
panies’ key characteristic, which together with some relation-specific 
investment would guarantee the quality of their final products.
a) The Case of Harim Corporation
Harim Corporation (Harim) is a major supplier of chicken meat-related 
products in Korea. Instead of outsourcing the production of feed for 
poultry and the production of chickens (raising chickens), Harim verti- 
cally integrated production units in upstream sectors, directly control- 
ling the provision of chicks, feedstuff, raising procedures, and so on. 
This vertical integration, a major advertisement point of the company, 
may have strengthened consumers’ confidence of its products, enabling 
it to have both higher prices and larger market shares than other firms 
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whose partners in the upstream sector are not vertically integrated.27
　　
b) The Case of Swatch Group Korea
Swatch Group Korea Ltd. is a subsidiary company of the Swatch 
Group Ltd. (Swatch) in Switzerland. Swatch is the largest manufacturer 
and distributor of watches in the world. Initially, it entered the Korean 
market through an agency contract, which allowed such agency to sell 
its products anywhere in Korea. As a result, many Swatch products 
acquired a low-priced image in Korea. To change such image, Swatch 
has put Swatch Group Korea under its direct management, making 
Swatch products available in directly-managed stores. Swatch also built 
its largest A/S center in Korea. These actions of vertically integrating 
local service units in Korea have been instrumental in improving con- 
sumers’ confidence on the quality of local service units, which in turn 
helped Swatch to restore its brand name (value) in the Korean market.28
c) The Case of the Life Insurance Market in Korea
With regard to a multinational firm’s entry into a local market, we 





) and qH＋qL＞1 in Section 4.A.29 In that situation, a 
long-term contract between a foreign firm with a brand name and a 
local firm is necessary for generating a separating equilibrium. Under 
such circumstance, prohibiting foreign direct investment may hinder 
market development in which consumers can buy products of HH pairs. 
For example, the Korean government had prohibited foreign direct in- 
vestment into its life insurance market prior to 1988, limiting the pro- 
vision of sophisticated whole life insurance programs in Korea.30 Upon 
27 The company’s website (http://www.harim.com/intro/about.hr), for example, 
explicitly emphasizes its vertically integrated production units as the main 
reason for consumers’ trust on their products and its success in the chicken 
meat industry. 
28 The Swatch Group Korea’s website (http://www.swatchgroup.co.kr/korean/ 
aboutus_main.asp) emphasizes its mother company’s direct investment into its 
A/S center in Korea and its direct control over distribution of its products as 
important characteristics of the company that would ascertain the quality of 
their products. 
29 Note that we can also consider a situation in which no local firm has a 
brand name with δ∈ (δCBIL, δCPIL) in the presence of a cross-sector inference 
problem. 
30 A sophisticated whole life insurance program requires well-trained employ- 
ees to develop a tailored program to each customer, as well as a reliable com- 
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the liberalization of life insurance market in 1988, well-known foreign 
life insurance companies directly invested in the Korean market, provid- 
ing sophisticated whole life insurance programs. The fact that a well- 
known life insurance company, such as Prudential Financial, Inc., has 
set a long-term relationship with its local sales unit by directly investing 
in Korea (vertical integration) could have strengthened consumers’ belief 
of their local sales units’ ability to tailor a whole life insurance program 
for the specific needs of each customer, thus enabling the provision of 
such service to the market.31
VI. Concluding Remarks  
In the presence of consumers’ incomplete information of the firms’ 
capacity to produce good components for a useful final product, we 
analyze firms’ commitment to a long-term production relationship as a 
possible way to convince consumers that they are engaged in partner- 
ship with high-type firms. In contrast to no brand leverage result of Choi 
and Jeon (2007) in the absence of any cross-sector inference problem, 
our analysis demonstrates that a firm with a brand name can restore 
its brand leverage by committing to a long-term production relationship. 
pany that can handle a whole life insurance policy. As discussed by Grossman 
and Hart (1986), a whole life insurance company is more likely to vertically in- 
tegrate its sales units (having the client list belong to the company rather than 
to its sales agency) possibly because of the typically high persistency of whole 
life insurance recipients. This in turn makes vertical integration an optimal own- 
ership choice for a better combination of ante investment levels by the com- 
pany and its sales units. In contrast to this incomplete contract approach to 
understand vertical integration, our analysis emphasizes the imperfect informa- 
tion of consumers about firm types as a possible driving force behind vertical 
integration in the Korean life insurance market.
31 Prior to opening its life insurance market to foreign direct investments, 
sales of life insurance policies in Korea had been conducted mainly by tem- 
porary workers with low levels of training. In fact, Prudential Life Insurance 
Company of Korea, Ltd (Prudential Korea), the Korean subsidiary of Prudential 
Financial, Inc., was the first life insurance company in Korea that have only 
hired regular workers with at least a 4 year-college degree and some work ex- 
perience for its sales units, calling them “life planners.” In addition, Prudential 
Korea makes non-negligible investment into life planners’ training (more than 6 
months). As discussed in “an example of relation-specific investment to block 
positive sorting” above, we can interpret such training as investment to convince 
consumers of their long-term production relationship. The website of Prudential 
Korea (http://www.prudential.co.kr/company/lp_intro.do) advertises its stringent 
selection process of “life planners” and their training process.
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Our analysis also reveals that the ex post gain from positive sorting 
may threaten the credibility of a long-term contract as an effective com- 
mitment device for a long-term relationship. As an alternative, we ex- 
plore the possibility of vertical integration with relation-specific invest- 
ment to restrain such positive sorting. This signaling motivation for ver- 
tical integration suggested by our analysis is different from the existing 
body of literature. Several cases of vertical integration as examples of 
vertical integration for signaling quality are also discussed.
Vertical integration for signaling quality may also be a reason for a 
company to choose foreign direct investment over foreign outsourcing. 
A firm may decide to move a part of its production process into a foreign 
country to save its production cost. With regard to partner’s type in a 
foreign country, domestic consumers may have very limited information. 
Therefore, choosing foreign direct investment (a long-term production 
relationship) instead of outsourcing (a short-term production relation- 
ship) can facilitate the firm’s signaling of its partnership with a high-type 
foreign firm.
There are several ways to extend the current model. For example, one 
can try to relax the simplifying assumptions. By relaxing the assump- 
tion of consumers being homogenous and sellers being on the short 
side of the market, we can allow the quantity demanded for a final 
product to depend on its price and other competing pairs’ pricing as 
well as their signaling through vertical integration. Such a generaliza- 
tion may provide a new understanding of a possible linkage between 
vertical integration for quality signaling and other characteristics of the 
market, such as the nature of competition among firms.32 The two- 
period model may also be extended into a multiple- or infinite-period 
model, characterizing the steady state characteristics of the signal game 
of firms producing complementary products. These extensions are non- 
trivial, thus, are possible directions for future research.         
(Received 5 May 2010; 17 September 2010; Accepted 24 September 
2010)
32 Once strategic interactions are introduced in the final product market 
under a more general setup, one may analyze the incentive for horizontal merger 
as well as the incentive for vertical integration. Although extensive literature 
exists on merger paradox, such as a study by Kabiraj and Lee (2003), an anal- 
ysis of interaction between the incentive for vertical integration for quality sig- 
naling and the incentive for horizontal merger may lead to some new findings.
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Appendix
Proof for Benchmark Results 1
(a) First, we can show that a separating equilibrium through price sig- 


















HH) must hold under a 
separating equilibrium from the necessary condition for the sepa- 
rating equilibrium described by (IR
P) and (ICP). Thus, it remains to 
























































HH)≤0, enabling a separating 
equilibrium through price signaling in which only HH pairs are 
productive. 



















HH being determined by 
VHL(p̅
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HH], there is only one equilibrium that survives the Cho- 











FF [1－(qH＋qL)/2]}. To show this, suppose that a pair 




HH] but different from  
p̅
1
HH. Then such HH pair firms can deviate and choose a price of 
p1HH＋ε, where ε is an infinitesimally small positive number. Since 
this new price satisfies the conditions of having a separating equi- 
librium, consumers would believe that this price has been chosen 







HH) and the only reasonable equilibrium price 





























HH) or equivalently, δ≥(cH－cL)/[(qH－qL) 
(p2SS－p
2
FF)/2－(cH－cL)] is the necessary and sufficient condition for 
the existence of a separating equilibrium through price signaling, as 
claimed in Benchmark Result 1 (a).
(b) We can show that a separating equilibrium through brand signaling 









HH) must hold under a 
separating equilibrium from (IR



















HH), which is obviously true given 
(A1). 
　
Proof for Proposition 1.
(a) First, we can show that a separating equilibrium through price sig- 





































HH) must hold under a 
separating equilibrium from the necessary condition for the sepa- 
rating equilibrium described by (IRIP) and (ICIP). Thus, it remains to 
show that there exists p
1













































































HH)≤0, enabling a separating equilibrium through price sig- 
naling in which only HH pairs are productive. While we have a con- 










H], once again 
there is only one equilibrium that survives the Cho-Kreps refinement 






H due to the same reason as the one 































































































































































FF)]－(cH－cL)} is the 
necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a separating 
equilibrium through price signaling, as claimed in Proposition 1 (a). 

















HH) must hold under a 
separating equilibrium where (IRIB) and (ICIB) are met. Thus, it 






























HH), which is obviously 







































































Proof for Benchmark Results 2.
(a) As shown in Proof for Benchmark Results 1 (a), the separating 































HH), satisfying the necessary and sufficient con- 




HH), then the 






































FF)－2(cH－cL)} is the necessary and sufficient 











(b) As shown in Proof for Benchmark Results (b), the separating equi- 









FF)－(cH－cL)}. Thus, the necessary and sufficient condi- 







Proof for Proposition 4.
(a) We can apply the same statements as in the proof for Benchmark 






















F)－2(cH－cL)} is the necessary and suf- 









F)＝(qHS－qHF)[2qH qHS＋(1－qH)(qHS＋qHF)]/(1＋qH), we 
can obtain Proposition 4 (a). 
(b) We can apply the same statements as in the proof for Benchmark 
Results 2 (b) in proving Proposition 4 (b), except replacing (p
2
SS－









F). Thus, the necessary and sufficient condition 
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